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Executive Summary 
Governments wishing to reduce inequality by redistributing money from 
the rich to the poor face the dilemma that in doing so (by increasing tax 
rates and means-tested benefits, for example) they reduce the incentive 
for  individuals  to  increase  their  incomes.  Policy-makers  have  tried  to 
balance these objectives in different ways and, partly as a result of this, the 
tax and benefit system today is very different from the one that existed 
thirty years ago. In this paper we look at how the tax and benefit system 
redistributed income and affected incentives to work in 2009–10, and at 
the effect of tax and benefit reforms between 1978–79 and 2009–10 on the 
level of inequality and work incentives. 
The tax and benefit system as a whole redistributes significantly from rich 
to  poor.  But  whether  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have  contributed  to  or 
counteracted the sharp increase in income inequality seen in the UK over 
the  last  30  years  is  hard  to  determine  definitively,  in  part  because  it 
depends on what is meant by ‘reform’. The tax and benefit system in 2009–
10 did more to reduce inequality than if the 1978–79 system had remained 
in  place  with  tax  thresholds  and  (more  importantly)  benefit  rates 
increased in line with inflation, but did less to reduce inequality than if the 
rates and thresholds of the 1978–79 system had kept pace with GDP per 
capita.  Within  this  period,  though,  Labour’s  reforms  were  clearly  more 
progressive than those of the previous Conservative government: Labour’s 
reforms between 1997 and 2009 had a similar effect on overall inequality 
as  increasing  benefit  rates  in  line  with  GDP,  while  the  Conservatives’ 
reforms were roughly equivalent to increasing benefit rates in line with 
inflation.  Labour’s  reforms  were  particularly  generous  to  low-income 
families with children and pensioners. 
When looking at work incentives, we distinguish between the incentive to 
be in paid work at all (as opposed to not working) and the incentive for 
those in work to increase their earnings. Taxes and withdrawn benefits 
meant that, in 2009–10, the additional income that workers received (or 
non-workers would have received) by being in work could ultimately buy 
them  around  half  of what their employer  paid  out,  on  average.  That  is 
much  the  same  as  it  was  thirty  years  earlier.  There  were,  however, 
changes within this period. The incentive for people to be in paid work, 
after weakening between 1978 and 1981, strengthened during the mid to 
late  1980s,  changed  little  change  during  the  course  of  the  1990s,  and 
weakened after 2003. Tax and benefit reforms have been one of the key 
drivers  of  these  changes.  The  Conservatives’  tax  and  benefit  reforms  
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unambiguously strengthened the incentive for people to be in paid work, 
whereas Labour’s between 1997 and 2009 had relatively little effect.  
While these trends in the incentive to work at all have been shared by 
most  groups,  the  incentive  for  lone  parents  to  be  in  work  did  not 
strengthen between 1978 and 1997, but has strengthened since 1999. The 
period since 1999 has also seen a weakening of the incentive for couples 
with children to have two earners rather than one. The expansion of in-
work support for low-income families with children since 1999 is the main 
factor  that  explains  these  two  trends.  Although  these  reforms 
strengthened the incentive for lone parents to work and for couples with 
children to have one earner, they weakened the incentive for couples with 
children to have two earners.  
For the vast majority of workers in 2009–10, an extra pound paid out by 
their employer would buy them between 40p and 60p-worth of goods and 
services. However, there was a significant minority of workers who would 
only keep between 17p and 27p of each additional pound they earned. 
This  is  because  they  faced  steep  withdrawal  of  tax  credits  or  housing 
benefit if they increased their earnings a little. The incentive for those in 
work to increase their earnings weakened on average between 1978 and 
2009.  This  was  particularly  true  for  workers  with  children,  and  can  to 
some extent be explained by tax and benefit reforms. In particular, over 
the  last  ten  years  more  and  more  working  families  with  children  have 
become eligible for means-tested benefits and tax credits, meaning that 
they  face  steep  withdrawal  of  these  as  they  increase  their  income. 
However,  tax  and  benefit  reforms  alone  cannot  explain  the  increase  in 
EMTRs among working parents – other factors such as increases in real 
earnings and rents are likely to have been important as well. By contrast, 
the  incentive  for  those  without  children  to  increase  their  earnings 
remained fairly constant over time.   
1.  Introduction 
Governments wishing to reduce inequality by redistributing money from 
the  rich  to  the  poor  face  the  dilemma  that  in  doing  so  (by  increasing 
means-tested  benefits  and  tax  rates,  for  example),  they  reduce  the 
incentive for individuals to increase their incomes.  Policy makers have 
tried to balance these objectives in different ways, and partly as a result 
the tax and benefit system today is very different from the one that existed 
thirty years ago. In this paper, we look at the effect of  the  UK tax and 
benefit system on the income distribution and work incentives in 2009,  
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and then go on to look at how tax and benefit between 1978 and 2009 
affected incomes and work incentives.  
Section 2 documents how the tax and benefit system redistributes from 
high-income  to  low-income  households,  as  well  as  providing  additional 
support to households with children and pensioners. It also looks at two 
aspects  of  work  incentives  created  by  the  tax  and  benefit  system:  the 
incentive for an individual to work at all, and the incentive for someone in 
work  to  earn  more.  We  show  how  these  incentives  vary  across  the 
population  and  how  they  depend  on  whether  a  person  has  children, 
whether they are a member of a couple and, if so, whether their partner 
works.  
In Section 3, we discuss how tax and benefit reforms between 1978 and 
2009  affected  the  overall  level  of  inequality  in  the  UK.  While  income 
inequality has increased dramatically in the UK  (see, for example  DWP 
(2010), Barnard (2010) and Joyce et al. (2010)), it is not clear whether this 
is as a result of, or in spite of, tax and benefit reforms. One strand of the 
literature in this area has compared how much the tax and benefit system 
has  reduced  income  inequality  in  different  years  (the  so-called  ‘actual 
payments’ approach). 1 Most studies that have used this methodology have 
concluded that the tax and benefit system reduces income inequality by as 
much as it did thirty years ago. But the amount of redistribution any given 
tax and benefit system does will depend on the initial distribution of 
income and other characteristics in the population in which it operates. 
Other  things  being  equal,  a  progressive  tax  and  benefit  system  will 
redistribute more if applied to a more unequal income distribution.  In this 
paper, we use the alternative ‘what if?’ approach to estimate how unequal 
the distribution of income would be today had there not been any tax and 
benefit  reforms  between  1978  and  2009  using  the  IFS  tax  and  benefit 
microsimulation  model,  TAXBEN.  Comparing  this  with  the  level  of 
inequality under the actual system yields an estimate the effect of tax and 
benefit reforms. While this avoids the problems of the ‘actual payments’ 
approach that arise from comparing different populations, there are two 
other important issues that arise with this methodology: 
  First,  one  is  required  to  take  a  view  as  to  what  the  ‘no-reform’ 
scenario  is  –  does  ‘no  change’  mean  increasing  tax  and  benefit 
parameters in line with prices, earnings or something else? As we 
                                                      
1 See, for example Goodman et al. (1997), Hills (2004) and Jones et al. (2009). Brewer 
et al. (2010) decomposes changing inequality in the UK and identifies the impact of the 
benefit system, but not that of the tax system.  
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shall  see,  this  decision  makes  a  fundamental  difference  to  our 
results.2   
  Secondly, in calculating what would have happened to inequality as 
the economy evolved if the tax and benefit system had not changed, 
we assume that tax and benefit reforms did not themselves affect 
the evolution of the economy. But individuals and firms respond to 
the  incentives  created  by  the  tax  and  benefit  system,  so  this 
assumption is unlikely to be accurate in practice. The true effect of 
tax and benefit reforms on inequality, therefore, depends not only 
on their direct redistributive effects, but also on how they affected 
people’s decisions to work, save, and so on. These indirect effects 
depend partly on how far individuals respond to such incentives, 
which is difficult to estimate; but we can more easily estimate how 
the  incentives  themselves  have  been  changed  by  tax  and  benefit 
reforms.  
We broadly follow the methodology of Clark and Leicester (2004), with 
some slight refinements that allow us to model the effect of local taxes and 
disability benefits. More details of our methodology are given in Appendix 
A. 
Section 4 uses the same ‘what if?’ methodology to calculate measures of 
work incentives created by suitably uprated tax and benefit systems from 
previous years. We examine whether tax and benefit reforms have made it 
more or less worthwhile for individuals to work at all and how they have 
affected the benefit to workers from earning a little more. In both of these, 
there are substantial variations in the trends across the population that 
are unclear from aggregate figures.  
The main contribution of this paper is to use what we consider to be the 
best practice to analyse the effect of tax and benefit reforms on inequality 
and work incentives in a consistent manner. This paper expands upon and 
updates analysis in the Mirrlees Review of the tax system (Adam et al., 
2010). This is itself an update and refinement of the analysis of the effect 
of tax and benefit reforms on income inequality presented in Clark and 
Leicester (2004). It also brings up to date descriptive information on the 
changes in work incentives over time and analysis of the effect of tax and 
benefit reforms on work incentives presented in Adam et al. (2006).  
                                                      
2 For more analysis of how the choice of uprating system affects the income 
distribution over time, see Sutherland et al. (2008).   
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The analysis in this paper was completed before the March 2010 Budget. It 
therefore  does  not  take  into  account  any  tax  and  benefit  reforms 
announced in either of the 2010 Budgets, or preannounced changes that 
took effect from April 2010. Browne and Phillips (2010) contains analysis 
of the effect of tax and benefit reforms between 1997 and 2010 on the 
distribution of household incomes and work incentives, which does take 
into account all measures in place in April 2010.  
Note that throughout this paper we assume full take-up of entitlements to 
means-tested benefits as calculated by the tax and benefit microsimulation 
model, rather than rely on  self-reported amounts. Since in practice not 
everyone will claim the benefits to which they are entitled, and there are 
some errors and lags in the claiming process, the tax and benefit system 
does less redistribution in reality than in our model.   
2.  The UK tax and benefit system in 2009–10 
In  this  section  we  present  an  overview  of  how  the  UK  tax  and  benefit 
system  in  2009–10  affected  the  distribution  of  income  and  work 
incentives.  
2.1  The effect of the UK tax and benefit system on the 
distribution of income 
Figure 2.1 below shows the overall redistributive effect of the UK tax and 
benefit system. It is clear that it redistributes money from high income to 
low  income  households,  with  benefits  minus  taxes  making  up 
approximately  half  of  the  disposable  income  of  the  poorest  tenth  of 
households, while the richest tenth find that net taxes amount to nearly 
half their income.3  
                                                      
3 The tax and benefit system looks rather more progressive in Figure 2.1 than in Table 
14 of Barnard (2010). This reflects several differences in methodology, two of which 
are particularly noteworthy. First, we simulate entitlement to means-tested benefits 
and tax credits; Barnard (2010) uses self-reported receipt, which dramatically 
underestimates total payments of tax credits in particular. Second, we assume 
employer National Insurance contributions (NICs) are incident on the firm’s workers 
(via lower wages), like employee NICs and income tax, whereas Barnard (2009) assume 
they are incident on the firm’s customers (via higher prices). Economic theory predicts 
that the long-run incidence of an earnings tax should not vary according to whether it 
is notionally levied on the employer or the employee.  
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Figure 2.1: Distributional impact of the UK tax and benefit system in 2009–10 
 
Notes: Income decile groups are derived by dividing households into ten equal-sized 
groups based on their disposable income adjusted for family size using the McClements 
equivalence scale. Assumes full take-up of means-tested benefits and tax credits.  
Excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates, though not 
employer National Insurance contributions) and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, 
stamp duties and capital gains tax). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, 
TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2005–06 Expenditure and Food Survey.  
 
Analysis by the Office for National Statistics (Barnard, 2010) shows that it 
is the benefit system that is responsible for the bulk of this reduction in 
inequality, reducing the Gini coefficient, a summary measure of inequality 
that can take values between zero (when everyone has the same income) 
and one (where one person has all the income in the economy), from 0.521 
to 0.376. 4 In other words, whereas the distribution of private income has a 
Gini coefficient of 0.521, the distribution of private income plus benefits is 
much less unequal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.376. Direct taxes reduce the 
Gini coefficient slightly further to 0.342, whereas indirect taxes appear to 
increase inequality slightly, increasing the Gini coefficient from 0.342 to 
0.377. This last point requires some qualification, however.  
Indirect  taxes  bear  heavily  on  those  with  high  expenditures,  and  will 
clearly target those with high incomes in any particular year less precisely 
than, say, an income tax does. But much low income observed at a point in 
                                                      
4 The Gini coefficient is half the average income gap between all pairs of individuals, as 
a fraction of average income. See, for example, Barr (2004) for an introduction and Sen 
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time is temporary and need not reflect low lifetime living standards: while 
some  people  are  persistently  poor,  many  have  volatile  earnings,  are 
temporarily unemployed, are studying, are taking a break from the labour 
market to raise children, are retired with hefty savings, etc. People’s ability 
to  borrow  and  save  means  that  those  with  low  current  incomes  will 
typically have high expenditure relative to their income, and many of those 
who in a particular year have low income but pay a lot in indirect taxes are 
people we would not ordinarily think of as ‘poor’. Over a lifetime, income 
and  expenditure  must  be  equal  (apart  from  inheritances),  and  indeed 
annual expenditure is arguably better than annual income as a guide to 
lifetime living standards.5 If we were to look at the effect of the tax and 
benefit  system  on  lifetime  income  inequality,  the  contr ast  between 
‘progressive’  direct  taxes  and  ‘regressive’  indirect  taxes  would  appear 
much  less  stark.  This  is  not  to  say  that  indirect  taxes  are  progressive 
relative to lifetime income – that depends on whether goods consumed 
disproportionately  by  the  lifetime-poor  are  taxed  more  heavily  (via 
tobacco duty, for example) or less heavily (as with VAT zero-rating of most 
food) than other goods – but certainly their effect on the distribution of 
annual income gives only a partial, and arguably misleading, impression of 
their overall effect. 
Figure  2.2  shows  that  the  tax  and  benefit  system  tends  to  redistribute 
income  from  households  with  more  workers  towards  those  with  fewer 
people  in  work,  and  from  working-age  households  without  children 
towards households with children and pensioners.  
                                                      
5 Studies that have examined the use of expenditure rather than income for looking at 
distributional outcomes include Goodman et al (1997), Blundell and Preston (1998), 
Meyer and Sullivan (2003, 2004), Goodman and Oldfield (2004) and Brewer et al 
(2006).  
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Figure 2.2: Distributional impact of the tax and benefit system by household type 
 
Notes: Assumes full take-up of means-tested benefits and tax credits.  Excludes most 
‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates, though not employer 
National Insurance contributions) and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp 
duties and capital gains tax). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, 
TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2005–06 Expenditure and Food Survey.  
 
Many  of  these  differences  between  household  types  are  in  reality  the 
result of their different positions in the income distribution. But Figure 3.3 
demonstrates  that  the  tax  and  benefit  system  distributes  money  to 
pensioners even once their position in the income distribution is taken 
into account. It also gives more support to households with children at the 
bottom of the income distribution, although not to those further up.  
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Single, not working
Single, working
Lone Parent, not working
Lone Parent, working
Zero earner couple, no children
Zero earner couple, children
One earner couple, no children
One earner couple, children
Two earner couple, no children
Two earner couple, children
Single Pensioner
Couple Pensioner
Multi family household, no children
Multi family household, children
Benefits minus taxes as a 
proportion of disposable 
income 
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Figure 2.3: Distributional impact of the UK tax and benefit system in 2009–10 
 
Notes: As for Figure 2.1. 
Source: As for Figure 2.1. 
 
2.2  Work incentives in the UK in 2009–10 
This section examines the distribution of work incentives in the UK under 
the current tax and benefit system. We begin by defining the summary 
measures of financial work incentives used in this paper before discussing 
how  we  calculate  these  measures  using  the  IFS  tax  and  benefit 
microsimulation model, TAXBEN. We then show how these vary across the 
whole population and between different types of individual in 2009–10. 
2.2.1 Defining our measures of financial work incentives 
An  individual’s  financial  incentive  to  work  depends  on  the  relationship 
between  hours  of  paid  work  and  net  income.  Therefore,  we  need  to 
consider the effects of all aspects of the tax and benefit system when we 
investigate  work  incentives,  not  simply  income  taxes  paid  by  those  in 
work. In particular, the withdrawal of means-tested benefits can be just as 
important  in  the  decision  of  whether  to  work  or  not  for  those  on  low 
incomes.  And  indirect  taxes  are  just  as  important  as  direct  taxes  and 
benefits: since the attractiveness of working presumably depends on the 
quantity of goods and services that can be purchased with net earnings, a 
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There are two important dimensions of work incentives that we attempt to 
quantify:  
  the financial reward for working compared to not working, which 
we call the incentive to work at all.  
  The incentive for those in work to earn more.  
The incentive to work at all 
Two  commonly  used  measures  of  the  incentive  to  work  at  all  are  the 
participation tax rate (PTR) and the replacement rate (RR). PTRs give the 
proportion of earnings that are not  taken away in tax or lower benefit 
entitlements  when  an  individual  starts  work,  while  RRs  give  an 
individual’s out of work income as a percentage of their in work income. 
Therefore, 
          
                                           
              
 
    
                      
                  
 
Therefore, someone whose income after taxes and benefits was £50 if they 
did not work and £200 if they did work, earning £250, would have a PTR of 
40% and a RR of 25%.  
For both of these measures: 
  Net income means income after benefits have been added and taxes 
deducted. 
  Low numbers indicate that the incentive to work is strong and vice 
versa. A PTR of 0% would indicate that an individual did not have to 
pay  any  tax  on  their  earnings  and  did  not  lose  any  benefit 
entitlement when they started work, whereas a RR of 0% would 
indicate that an individual would not receive any income if they did 
not  work.  A  PTR  or  RR  of  100%  would  indicate  that  all  of  an 
individual’s  earnings  would  be  taken  from  them  in  tax  or  lower 
benefit entitlements if they worked, so they would be no better off 
working  than  not  working.  High  PTRs  and  RRs  are  sometimes 
referred to as the ‘unemployment trap’.  
  We include employers’ National Insurance and indirect taxes in the 
PTR measures where appropriate by including employers’ National 
Insurance  in  gross  employer  cost  and  adding  on  the  household’s  
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average consumption tax rate. Therefore, the PTRs that we report 
here are as follows: 
     
    
                                           
                                    
       
 
Where 
      
                         
                 
 
  For individuals in couples, it is possible to calculate the RR and PTR 
using  individual  or  family  income,  and  this  choice  will  affect  our 
impression  of  the  strength  of  the  financial  reward  to  work.  For 
example, a low-earning person living with a high-earning partner 
may have no independent income if he or she does not work, and 
therefore would have a very low RR – a strong financial incentive to 
work – when calculated using individual income. However, the same 
individual would have a very high RR when calculated using family 
income, because whether he or she works makes little difference 
proportionally to the family’s income. By contrast, the PTR for this 
individual is likely to be very low (if the individual is only paying 
income  tax  and  employee  national  insurance  contributions  on  a 
small  portion  of  their  earnings,  and  is  in  a  family  too  rich  to  be 
entitled to tax credits) regardless of whether individual or family 
income  is  used  for  the  calculation.  In  this  paper,  we  use  family 
income for both measures.  
Both these measures attempt to capture the incentive to work at all, but 
they  are  different,  and  as  a  result  of  this,  these  measures  behave 
differently following different sorts of changes in income. In particular:  
  A constant increase in income at all hours does not change the PTR, 
but increases the RR. This means that the PTR would suggest no 
change in incentives, but the RR would suggest that they have got 
weaker.  
  At a given level of hours of work, an increase in the gross hourly 
wage will strengthen incentives according to the RR, but will have 
ambiguous effects according to the PTR.  
According to economic theory, the impact of an equal cash gain in in-work 
and  out-of-work  incomes  should  be  to  reduce  the  attractiveness  of 
working compared to not working, and the impact of an increase in the  
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hourly wage should be the reverse. The RR captures this intuition from 
simple  economic  theory.  However,  the  PTR  describes  how  the  tax  and 
benefit  system  affects  the  incentive  to  work:  it  distinguishes  between 
whether a reduced reward to work is caused by higher taxes or lower 
wages, for example, which the RR does not. Broadly speaking, therefore, 
the  RR  measures  the  strength  of  work  incentives  whereas  the  PTR 
measures the effect of the tax and benefit system on work incentives. Both 
are interesting, and because of this difference in what the two measures 
are describing, much of the empirical analysis that follows will use both 
measures.  
For non-workers, an assumption is required about how much they would 
earn, and how many hours they would work, if they did move into work. 
We describe how we approach this in Box 2.1. 
Appendix  A  gives  some  technical  details  of  how  we  measure  work 
incentives,  but  one  issue  that  deserves  highlighting  is  the  treatment  of 
support for mortgage interest (SMI). SMI is available as part of out-of-work 
benefits  (income  support,  income-based  jobseeker’s  allowance  (JSA), 
income-based  employment  and  support  allowance  and  pension  credit), 
but  it  is  not  available  for  the  full  duration  of  benefit  claims:  there  is  a 
waiting period before SMI becomes payable, and JSA claimants can receive 
SMI only for a maximum of two years.6 It is therefore unclear whether 
estimates of RRs and PTRs should include SMI in out-of-work income. SMI 
is often overlooked because relatively few people actually receive it – only 
4% of income support claimants and 3% of income-based JSA claimants, 
for example7. But SMI matters more for work incentives than this implies, 
because while more non-workers rent their accommodation than have a 
mortgage, most workers have  a mortgage. The potential availability for 
SMI can thus be important for many people in work.  Throughout this 
paper, we assume that SMI is available to all those who meet the non-time-
related eligibility criteria. But we note that including SMI in this way can 
have a significant impact on  estimated incentives to work at all for some 
                                                      
6 Rules on SMI, including the length of the waiting period and the time-limiting of 
payments to JSA claimants, have been subject to rapid change recently and are likely to 
change again. For current purposes the important point is that SMI is only available in 
some parts of benefit spells. 
7 Source: DWP Tabulation Tool 
(http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=tabtool), based on 5% sample data 
for February 2010. Corresponding figures for pension credit are not given, but are 
likely to be rather higher: pension credit claimants make up the majority of SMI 
recipients.  
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groups – the first earner in families, and particularly those with children. 
This is shown in chapter 4 of Mirrlees et al. (forthcoming).  
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BOX 2.1: Calculating in-work incomes for non-workers 
It is relatively straightforward to use a tax and benefit microsimulation model 
to work out what someone’s family income would be if they did not work. 
However, we need to make more assumptions to calculate what non-workers 
would earn were they to start work. Numerous econometric techniques have 
been devised to perform such analysis, but in this paper we keep to a relatively 
simple approach: 
  We first estimate an OLS log earnings equation for each of four hours bands 
(0-15, 16-23, 24-29 and 30+) using those individuals observed in the 
relevant hours category in our data, regressing log weekly earnings of 
individuals observed employed in the relevant hours category on various 
characteristics including age, sex, ethnicity, housing tenure, number of 
children and partnership status.
 8 
  We then use the estimated impacts of these characteristics on earnings to 
predict earnings for the non-workers if they were to work that number of 
hours. Since a large part of the variation of earnings is unexplained by these 
characteristics, we add to each prediction an error term drawn from the 
distribution of residuals. This enables us to calculate a hypothetical PTR and 
RR for each individual if they were to work that number of hours. 
  We then use a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of each 
individual choosing to work that number of hours, conditional on working at 
all, again using the observed behaviour of the workers in our data.  
  To create a single PTR and RR for each non-worker, we create an average of 
the PTRs and RRs for the four hours bands, weighted using these predicted 
probabilities.  
There are problems with this approach, the main one being that earnings in 
work are a large determinant of the decision to start work, and therefore it 
would be natural to expect that the earnings that would be earned by someone 
not currently working would be lower than those earned by someone currently 
in work with identical observed characteristics. So-called ‘selection 
adjustments’ can be made to overcome biases introduced into the model in this 
way, but these typically require strong assumptions about the relationship 
between an individual’s wage rate and how many hours they decide to work. 
We therefore keep to a very simple approach, although it is likely that this will 
overestimate earnings in work for non-workers. This means that our estimates 
of RRs for non-workers are likely to be biased downwards, but it is ambiguous 
in which direction our estimates of PTRs for these individuals will be biased. 
                                                      
8 The coefficients of these equations are available on request.    
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The incentive to earn more 
The incentive for those in work to increase their earnings can be measured 
by the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The EMTR measures how much 
of a small change in employer cost is lost to tax payments and forgone 
state benefit and tax credit entitlements, and it tells us about the strength 
of the incentive for individuals to increase their earnings slightly, whether 
through working more hours, or through promotion, qualifying for bonus 
payments  or  getting  a  better-paid  job.  In  this  paper,  we  use  the  term 
“incentive to earn more” for all these possibilities.  
As with the incentive to work at all, low numbers mean stronger financial 
incentives. An EMTR of zero means that the individual keeps all of any 
small change in what their employer pays, and a rate of 100% means that 
the individual keeps none. High EMTRs amongst workers in low-income 
families are often referred to as the poverty trap.   
2.2.2 The incentive to work at all 
Work incentives for all working-age adults 
Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative distribution of PTRs for the whole adult 
population  below  state  pension  age,  including  non-workers  using 
predicted earnings in work as described above. Reading across, we can see 
that around 20% of adults under the state pension age have PTRs below 
40%,  and  30%  have  PTRs  above  60%.  This  means  that  around  half  of 
adults below the state pension age have PTRs in a relatively narrow band 
from 40% to 60% – their earnings can buy them about half of what they 
cost their employer. It is also clear that one of the reasons non-workers do 
not work is that the incentive for them to work at all is, on average, weaker 
– around 30% of non-workers have PTRs above 70%, compared to only 
10% of workers. Indeed, of those who have PTRs greater than 70%, 60% 
do not work.   
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative distribution of PTRs in 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes and benefits only: excludes 
most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates though not employer 
NI), and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-
work incomes for non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Excludes those over 
state pension age. 
Source: As for Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the same picture for RRs. We can see that there is more 
variation in RRs than in PTRs. Variation in RRs comes about for a number 
of reasons: people work (or would work) different numbers of hours at 
different wages, and are entitled to different levels of income when they 
are out of work. Around two-thirds of non-workers receive at least half of 
what  they  would  receive  if  they  worked,  whereas  only  half  of  workers 
would receive this much if they did not work. This again shows that one of 
the likely reasons why non-workers do not work is that the incentive for 
them to do so is not as strong. It should be noted, though, that many non-
workers have a partner who works, and therefore one reason their RRs 
are high is because their earnings would represent only a small proportion 
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative distribution of RRs in 2009–10 
 
Notes: As for Figure 2.4. 
Source: As for Figure 2.4. 
 
How does the incentive to work at all vary by family type? 
We have seen how much the incentive to work at all varies across the 
whole  population  of  working-age  adults.  Much  of  this  variation  can  be 
accounted for by differences in the way the tax and benefit system treats 
people with and without children, single people and members of couples 
and, among those in couples, by differences between those whose partner 
does and does not work. Therefore, the ‘partner works’ category contains 
all of those in two-earner couples, and non-earners in one-earner couples. 
The ‘partner doesn’t work’ category contains all of those in zero-earner 
couples and earners in one-earner couples. The number of people falling 
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Table 2.1: Number of individuals falling into each group 
Group  Number in population below state pension age (millions) 
  Workers  Non-workers  Total 
Single, no children  6.9  3.3  10.3 
Lone parent  0.9  0.9  1.8 
Couple with children, 
partner works 
6.6  1.7  8.3 
Couple with children, 
partner doesn’t work 
1.7  0.9  2.5 
Couple without children, 
partner works 
7.3  1.4  8.7 
Couple without children, 
partner doesn’t work 
1.6  1.6  3.2 
Total  25.1  9.6  34.8 
Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2005 EFS.  
 
Figure 2.6: Cumulative distribution of PTRs by family type 
 
Notes: As for Figure 2.4. 
Source: As for Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative distribution of PTRs for each of these six 
types of individual. We can see that those individuals who would receive 
large amounts of out-of-work support if they did not work, such as lone 
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have the weakest incentives to work. On the other hand, those who would 
not  receive  such  entitlements,  namely  those  whose  partner  is  working, 
have the strongest incentives to work. Single people without children and 
those in couples without children  whose partner does  not work would 
receive  some  out-of-work  benefits  if  they  stopped  work,  but  these  are 
much less generous than for those with children. Therefore, their PTRs fall 
somewhere in the middle.  
Figure 2.7: Cumulative distribution of RRs by family type 
 
Notes: As for Figure 2.4. 
Source: As for Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure  2.7  performs  the  same  analysis  for  RRs.  The  positions  of  the 
different types of individual change when we consider  RRs rather than 
PTRs:  those  who  have  a  working  partner  now  appear  to  have  a  much 
weaker incentive to work. This comes about because their earnings make 
up a relatively small proportion of their family’s income, and therefore the 
family’s  income  would  not  be  very  much  lower  if  they  did  not  work. 
Therefore,  their  RR  is  high  when  family  income  is  used  as  the  income 
measure. As we discussed in section 2.2, the picture would be reversed if 
individual  income  were  used  as  the  income  measure.  This  is  because 
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entitlements  when  they  are  not  working,  meaning  that  their  individual 
out-of-work income, and hence their RR, would be very low.  
2.2.3 The incentive to earn more 
The distribution of effective marginal tax rates among workers 
Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of EMTRs among all workers in 2009–10. 
We see that the distribution is highly concentrated in the range from 40% 
to 60%, with three-quarters of workers having EMTRs in this range. This is 
not surprising given that the combined marginal income tax and National 
Insurance  rate  for  most  individuals  (including  both  employee  and 
employer NI contributions) was between 35.5% and 47.7% in 2009–10.9 
There is a small but significant group of around  10% of workers who 
would only keep between  17p  and  27p of each additional pound they 
earned.  This  is  because  they  face   steep  withdrawal  of  tax  credits  or 
housing benefit if they increased their earnings a little.  
                                                      
9 Of course, consumption tax rates also need to be added on to these rates. For 
someone who has no means-tested benefit entitlement, 
 
                                                 
                                        
                        . Consumption tax rates 
are different for each household based on their consumption patterns, which is why the 
jumps in the line are not vertical.   
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Figure 2.8: Cumulative distribution of EMTRs in 2009–10, workers only 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes  (notably  inheritance  tax,  stamp  duties  and  capital  gains  tax).  Excludes  non- 
workers. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on uprated data from the 2005–06 EFS.  
 
How does the incentive to earn more vary by family type? 
Figure  2.9  shows  the  distribution  of  EMTRs  for  the  same  six  types  of 
individual as in Figure 2.7. We see that the distribution of EMTRs is even 
more highly concentrated between 40% and 60% for those groups who 
are less likely to be subject to withdrawal of means-tested tax credits or 
housing and council tax benefits, namely those without children and those 
in  two-earner  couples  with  children.  However,  40%  of  working  lone 
parents and 35% of couple parents whose partner does not work have 
very high EMTRs of between 75% and 80%. This is because these are the 
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Figure 2.9: Cumulative distribution of workers’ EMTRs by family type 
 
Notes: As for Figure 2.8. 
Source: As for Figure 2.8. 
 
3.  The  effect  of  thirty  years  of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  on  the 
distribution of income 
We  saw  in  section  2.1  that  the  tax  and  benefit  system  reduces  income 
inequality. However, the UK has seen an exceptionally large increase in 
income inequality in the last 30 years. Figure 3.1 shows the Gini coefficient 









































Effective marginal tax rate
Single, no children
Lone Parent
Couple with children, partner works
Couple with children, partner doesn't work
Couple without children, partner works
Couple without children, partner doesn't work 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
24 
Figure 3.1: Inequality at different stages of the redistributive process, 1978-2008 
 
Note:  Excludes  corporation  tax,  inheritance  tax,  stamp  duty  on  securities  and  some 
smaller taxes. Years are fiscal years from 1993 onwards (so 2008 means 2008–09) and 
calendar years before that.  
Sources: Barnard (2010) and Jones et al. (2008).  
 
The  amount  by  which  the  tax  and  benefit  system  reduces  the  Gini 
coefficient did not change significantly between 1978 and 2008. This does 
not mean, however, that the tax and benefit systems at the beginning and 
end  of  the  period  were  equally  progressive  since,  as  we  discussed  in 
section  2.1,  the  amount  of  redistribution  that  a  given  tax  and  benefit 
system achieves depends on the distribution of private income and other 
characteristics of the population. Any progressive tax and benefit system 
will achieve more redistribution when the initial level of income inequality 
is higher, as there will be more people paying higher rates of tax at the top 
of  the  income  distribution,  and  more  people  eligible  for  means-tested 
benefits at the bottom. Therefore, a different approach is needed to isolate 
the effects of tax and benefit reforms.  
As  we  argued  in  section  1,  the  ‘what  if?’  approach  can  be  used  to 
investigate what income inequality would have been had previous years’ 
tax and benefit systems been kept unreformed. But as we have already 
mentioned,  this  requires  us  to  take  a  view  as  to  what  “unreformed” 
actually means: would it mean benefit levels and tax thresholds keeping 
pace with price inflation or growth in average earnings, GDP or something 
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  one  in  which  all  taxes  and  benefits  are  uprated  in  line  with  the 
Retail Prices Index (RPI) so that there is no real change in rates and 
thresholds; 
  a second in which they are increased in line with growth in per-
capita GDP and; 
  a third in which tax thresholds (and excise duties and local taxes) 
are increased in line with the RPI but benefit (and tax credit) rates 
are increased in line with per-capita GDP.10  
The  rationale  for  this  third  scenario  is  two -fold:  first,  it  corresponds 
reasonably closely to the government’s standard uprating practice prior to 
1978; and second, reforms since 1978 have had relatively little impact on 
the overall budgetary position if measured relative to this baseline (much 
less than relative to universal price-uprating or universal GDP-uprating), 
which seems like a relatively ‘neutral’ counterfactual to choose.11  
Throughout this paper we use an uprated 2005 population – this tells us 
the effect of tax and benefit reforms on the level of inequality among the 
2005 population. If underlying household characteristics have significantly 
changed over time, though, for example if one group was relatively poor in 
1978 but relatively rich now, then this might not be a good guide to the 
effects of a particular reform at the time it was introduced. Using data from 
that time would be necessary to answer this question. Clark and Leicester 
(2004) analyse reforms relative to RPI-uprating from 1979 to 2001 using 
data from each year to look at that year’s reforms, and find that this makes 
little difference to their results, so we do not repeat their analysis here.12  
Figure 3.2 shows how different the Gini coefficient in 2009 would be if 
previous tax and benefit systems had remained in place and simply been 
                                                      
10 For brevity we refer to uprating in line with GDP rather than GDP per capita from 
now on.  
11 Government borrowing in 2009–10 would be £65bn lower if a price-uprated 1978 
tax and benefit system had been in place, £30bn higher under a GDP-uprated 1978 
system but only £10bn lower in our third scenario. Note that these estimates, like 
Figure 18, ignore changes to most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and 
business rates) and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital 
gains tax).  
12 The only exception to this is for the reforms introduced by the new Conservative 
government in 1979. Their abolition of the very high income tax rates above 60% 
affected very few individuals at the time, as there were very few individuals with 
incomes high enough to be subject to these rates, but if the reform is simulated in 
2005, there is a much larger effect on inequality as a result of there being more 
individuals affected.   
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uprated  according  to  these  three  baseline  scenarios.  The  effect  of  any 
sampling error is small, as shown by the dotted lines around the central 
estimate.13 The figure shows, for example, that  the Gini would be 0.0 29 
higher if the 1978 tax and benefit system had simply been uprated in line 
with the RPI: in other words, reforms relative to price indexation since 
then have acted to reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.0 29. It is clear that the 
choice of baseline is of crucial importance.  The 2009 tax and benefit 
system reduced inequality considerably more than the 1978 system would 
have done if it had been price -indexed, but by much less than if benefits 
had been GDP-indexed after 1978. (Whether tax thresholds are increased 
in line with prices or GDP does not significantly alter this conclusion.) 
Indeed, relative to a GDP-uprated baseline, tax and benefit reforms  from 
1978 to 2008 acted to increase the Gini coefficient by about 0.03 4, and 
accounted for  more than a quarter   of the total increase in disposable 
income inequality up to 2008 shown in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.2: Effect on the Gini coefficient of replacing the 2009–10 tax and benefit 
system with those from previous years uprated in line with RPI 
 
Note: Gini coefficients are for post-tax income, after direct and indirect personal taxes 
and benefits: excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates, 
though  not  employer  National  Insurance  contributions)  and  capital  taxes  (notably 
inheritance  tax,  stamp  duties  and  capital  gains  tax).  Taxes  and  benefits  are  those 
applying in April of the year shown. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals 
based on 200 repetitions of the bootstrap.  
Source:  Authors’  calculations  using  the  IFS  tax  and  benefit  micro-simulation  model, 
TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2005–06 Expenditure and Food Survey.   
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What is clear, however, is that Labour’s reforms were more progressive 
than the Conservatives’. Labour’s reforms between 1997 and 2009 had a 
similar effect on overall inequality as increasing benefit rates in line with 
GDP  (and  would  be  virtually  identical  if  we  excluded  the  effect  of  the 
temporary  VAT  cut  in  2009),  while  the  Conservatives’  reforms  were 
roughly equivalent to increasing them in line with inflation.  This masks 
substantial  variation  between  different  periods,  though:  for  example, 
reforms between 1986 and 1990 increased the Gini coefficient by 0.023 
relative to RPI indexation, while reforms in the years before and after this 
tended  to  reduce  inequality  on  the  whole.  In  particular,  the  large 
reductions in top income tax rates in 1979 and 1988 were associated with 
large increases in inequality. Cuts in the basic rate of income tax,  as in 
1987, 1996 and 1997, are also associated with increasing inequality. This 
is not surprising since income tax cuts are worth nothing to lower income 
households who do not pay any income tax to start with, and are worth the 
most to the richest households.  
Similarly, increases in direct tax rates are associated with lower inequality, 
as  in  1986  when  employers’  National  Insurance  contributions  were 
extended  above  the  Upper  Earnings  Limit,  and  in  2003  when  National 
Insurance rates were increased by 1%. Other increases in direct taxes, for 
example  through  lower  income  tax  thresholds,  as  in  1981,  were  also 
associated  with  lower  inequality,  though  these  had  a  smaller  effect  on 
overall  inequality  as  they  cost  each  taxpayer  the  same  cash  amount, 
meaning a higher proportion of income for low income taxpayers. The shift 
from joint to individual taxation in 1990 is also associated with an increase 
in income inequality. This reform redistributed income from one-earner to 
two-earner couples, who tend to have higher incomes. 1990 was also the 
year in which the community charge or poll tax was introduced in England 
and Wales, which was also responsible for increasing inequality. 
Benefit increases tend to reduce inequality. Many benefits are explicitly 
means-tested.  But  even  non-means-tested  benefits  tend  to  reduce 
inequality, both because they are typically given to groups such as families 
with  children  or  pensioners  who  tend  to  be  lower  down  the  income 
distribution,  and  because  a  given  cash  amount  is  worth  more  as  a 
percentage  of  income  to  poorer  households.  Between  1999  and  2004, 
large  increases  in  means-tested  support  for  families  with  children  and 
pensioners – such as increases in income support levels for families with 
children,  the  introduction  of  the  working  families’  tax  credit  (and 
subsequent  replacement  with  child  and  working  tax  credits),  and  the 
introduction  of  the  minimum  income  guarantee  for  pensioners  (and 
subsequent  replacement  with  pension  credit)  –  were  associated  with  a  
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large reduction in inequality. Note that this reduction is larger when we 
look at reforms relative to RPI indexation of benefits, since in times of 
positive real income growth, increases in benefits are larger relative to this 
baseline than to the baseline of GDP-indexation.  
A concern we might have with these results is that they are dependent on 
some peculiarity of the Gini coefficient. To address this, Figures 4.3–4.5 
look at the effect of returning to previous years’ tax and benefit systems on 
other  measures  of  inequality.  We  normalise  each  of  these  so  that  they 
equal 1 in 2009–10. The measures we consider are as follows: 
  The 90:10 ratio is the simplest of these measures: it is the ratio of 
the income of the household at the 90th percentile point to that at 
the 10th percentile point. Therefore, only changes that affect these 
two  points  of  the  income  distribution  will  affect  this  measure. 
Changes that only affect the bottom 10%, or the top 10%, or that 
only affect the distribution within the middle 80% of the income 
distribution leave this measure unchanged.  
  The Atkinson measure allows one to choose a value for society’s 
aversion to inequality, defining the amount that society considers it 
necessary to give a ‘poor’ person, having taken a given amount of 
income from a ‘rich’ person, in order to keep overall social welfare 
the same. The (essentially arbitrary) value we have chosen for this 
parameter is 1.5, which reflects a society that considers it necessary 
to give £33 to a ‘poor’ person to justify taking £100 from a ‘rich’ 
person.14   
  The mean log deviation (MLD) measures the expected percentage 
difference  between  a  randomly  selected  individual  and  overall 
mean income. It is particularly sensitive to changes affecting the 
very bottom of the income distribution.  
  The  coefficient  of  variation  (CV)  is  the  ratio  of  the  standard 
deviation of the income distribution to its mean. It is particularly 
sensitive  to  changes  affecting  the  very  top  of  the  income 
distribution. 
                                                      
14 For more discussion of this measure, see Brewer et al. (2006).   
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Figure 3.3: Effect on various measures of inequality of replacing the 2009–10 tax 
and benefit system with those from previous years uprated in line with RPI 
 
Note: All measures are for post-tax income, after direct and indirect personal taxes and 
benefits: excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates, 
though  not  employer  National  Insurance  contributions)  and  capital  taxes  (notably 
inheritance  tax,  stamp  duties  and  capital  gains  tax).  Taxes  and  benefits  are  those 
applying in April of the year shown.  
Source:  Authors’  calculations  using  the  IFS  tax  and  benefit  micro-simulation  model, 
TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2005–06 Expenditure and Food Survey.   
 
We can see that all the measures give a similar impression of the effect of 
policy reforms on inequality. All the measures show that reforms between 
1978  and  1980  and  1986  and  1990  tended  to  increase  inequality 
compared to the baseline of RPI indexation whereas those between 1980 
and 1985 and since 1995 have tended to reduce inequality. Nevertheless, 
there are some subtle and interesting differences between the different 
measures: 
  The  coefficient  of  variation  is  the  only  measure  under  which 
inequality would be higher in a price-uprated 1978 tax and benefit 
system.  This  is  because  this  measure  is  particularly  sensitive  to 
changes  that  affect  the  very  top  of  the  income  distribution.  The 
reduction in the top rate of income tax from 83% in 1978 to 40% 
since  1988  has  a  particularly  large  influence  on  this  measure, 
therefore.  
  By contrast, the 90:10 ratio is unaffected by changes that only affect 
the  richest  tenth  of  households.  Therefore,  reductions  in  top 
income  tax  rates  have  relatively  little  impact  on  this  measure, 
meaning  that  the  Conservatives’  reforms  also  appear  to  have 
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The  measures  also  behave  in  a  similar  way  when  we  use  the  baseline 
where benefits are uprated in line with GDP and taxes are increased in line 
with the RPI (Figure 3.4) and when we use the baseline where both are 
increased in line with GDP (Figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.4: Effect on various measures of inequality of replacing the 2009–10 tax 
and benefit system with those from previous years with benefits uprated in line 
with GDP and taxes uprated in line with RPI 
 
Notes: As for Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.5: Effect on various measures of inequality of replacing the 2009–10 tax 
and benefit system with those from previous years uprated in line with GDP 
 
Notes: As for Figure 3.3. 
Source: As for Figure 3.3.  
 
A further way of demonstrating the effect of tax and benefit reforms on the 
distribution  of income is to look at changes by income decile  group or 
household type. 15 Figure 3.6 shows the distributional effect of all reforms 
since 1978 relative to each of the three baselines. We again find that the 
baseline chosen is of crucial importance. Relative to RPI uprating, reforms 
since  1978  represent  a  giveaway  to  all  income  decile  groups,  with  the 
poorest  half  and  the  richest  tenth  of  households  gaining  most  as  a 
percentage  of  income.  Compared  to  the  scenario  where  benefits  are 
uprated in line with GDP and taxes uprated in line with the RPI, though, we 
get a very different picture for low income households. This is because 
benefits are a very important component of their income and, while there 
have been real increases in benefits since 1978, these have not kept pace 
with increases in per-capita GDP. By contrast, higher-income households 
are unsurprisingly more affected by whether tax thresholds are uprated in 
line with RPI or GDP than by what happens to benefits. When we compare 
reforms relative to GDP indexation of tax thresholds as well as benefits, 
                                                      
15 Note that we rank households by their equivalised net income under the 2009 tax 
and benefit system. We could alternatively have chosen to do so based on their net 
income under the 1978 tax and benefit system, or their gross income. The first of these 
would tend to make reforms look more progressive, as those who have benefited most 
from the reforms would be higher up the income distribution in 2009 as a result, while 
the effect of the second is ambiguous. Jenkins and van Kerm (2008) discuss these issues 
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only  the  richest  tenth  of  households  have  gained  on  average.  This  is 
because it is only for these households that the reductions in statutory 
marginal income tax rates since 1978 have been sufficient to compensate 
for the fact that tax thresholds have not risen in line with GDP. 
Figure 3.6: Distributional impact of tax and benefit reforms from 1978 to 2009 
 
Notes: Households divided into ten equally sized groups based on their disposable 
income, adjusted for family size. Assumes full take-up of means-tested benefits.  
Excludes most ‘business taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates, though not 
employer National Insurance contributions) and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, 
stamp duties and capital gains tax). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on uprated data from the 2005–06 
EFS.  
 
Figure 3.7 shows the same analysis by household type. We again see a big 
difference  in  the  results  depending  on  which  baseline  we  use.  For 
household  types  who  have  large  benefit  entitlements,  namely  those 
without any adults in work (including pensioners), the big difference in 
the results is between the baselines where benefits are increased in line 
with RPI and those where they are increased in line with GDP. By contrast, 
for those household types whose entitlement to benefits is low and tax 
liabilities are large, in particular single workers and two-earner couples, 
the difference is greater between the baselines where tax thresholds are 
increased in line with the RPI and that where they are increased in line 
with  GDP.  Relative  to  a  baseline  of  RPI-indexation,  pensioners  and  low 
income households  with children have gained the most since 1978 and 
two earner couples have gained least. This picture almost reverses when 
we compare reforms relative to a baseline where benefits are increased in 
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couples and single people in work have benefited most from reforms since 
1978, whereas lone parents and single childless people not in work are 
worse  off.  Compared  to  a  baseline  of  GDP-indexation,  most  household 
types are worse off on average, with pensioners and non-working single 
people (with or without children) losing the most from reforms. But zero-
earner  couples  and  two-earner  couples  without  children  have  still 
benefited from reforms relative to this baseline.  
Figure 3.7: Distributional impact of tax and benefit reforms from 1978 to 2009 by 
family type 
 
Notes: As for Figure 3.6. 
Source: As for Figure 3.6.  
 
We saw in Figure 3.3 that there was a big difference between the reforms 
enacted by Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 and those 
enacted by Labour between 1997 and 2009 in terms of their progressivity. 
Figure  3.8  shows  the  effect  of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  since  1997  by 
household income decile:16 
                                                      
16 Figure 3.8 appears different to figures in Chapter 3 of Browne and Phillips (2010). 
This is because Browne and Phillips attempt to account for tax and benefit reforms that 
are difficult to attribute to particular households (predominantly those levied on 
businesses and on capital gains) by assuming that they affect all households equally as 
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Figure 3.8: Distributional impact of tax and benefit reforms from 1997 to 2009 
 
Notes: As for Figure 3.6. 
Source: As for Figure 3.6. 
 
We see that Labour’s reforms since 1997 have been clearly progressive, no 
matter  which  baseline  is  used.  However,  the  degree  of  progressivity 
appears greater when compared with the relatively ungenerous baseline 
of RPI indexation than those where benefits are increased in line with GDP. 
This  analysis  does,  however,  disguise  considerable  variation  between 
different household types, as Figure 3.9 shows. In particular, households 
with children and pensioners have gained significantly from Labour’s tax 
and benefit reforms, whereas working-age adults without children have 
scarcely  benefited  from  Labour’s  reforms,  no  matter  which  baseline  is 
used as the basis of comparison. 
                                                                                                                                                        
a proportion of their income. This gives a more accurate impression of the overall net 
tax rise from households as a result of tax and benefit reforms (since all taxes are 
ultimately incident on households), but is unlikely to be an accurate description of the 
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Figure 3.9: Distributional impact of tax and benefit reforms from 1997 to 2009 by 
household type 
 
Notes: As for Figure 3.6. 
Source: As for Figure 3.6.  
 
Summary 
Inequality has increased since 1978, but whether tax and benefit reforms 
are responsible for this depends on what is meant by a ‘reform’. Relative to 
a  baseline  of  RPI-indexation,  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have  reduced 
inequality slightly; but reforms have increased inequality when compared 
to a baseline where benefits are increased in line with GDP. Even in this 
case though, tax and benefit reforms are only responsible for around a 
quarter of the increase in the Gini coefficient between 1978 and 2008.  
Labour’s  tax  and  benefit  reforms  between  1997  and  2009  tended  to 
reduce inequality, whereas those of the previous Conservative government 
tended  to  increase  it.  Labour’s  reforms  were  particularly  generous  to 
households with children and pensioners.  
One caveat to these findings is needed. In calculating what would have 
happened  to  inequality  as  the  economy  evolved  if  the  tax  and  benefit 
system had not changed, we assume that tax and benefit reforms did not 
themselves affect the evolution of the economy. But individuals and firms 
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respond to the incentives created by the tax and benefit system, so this 
assumption is unlikely to be accurate in practice. The true effect of tax and 
benefit reforms on inequality, therefore, depends not only on their direct 
redistributive effects, but also on how they affected people’s decisions to 
work, save, and so on. These indirect effects depend partly on how far 
individuals respond to such incentives, which is difficult to estimate; but 
we  can  more  easily  estimate  how  the  incentives  themselves  have  been 
changed by tax and benefit reforms, and it is to this question that we now 
turn. 
4.  The effect of thirty years of tax and benefit reforms on work 
incentives 
Section 2.2 looked at the distribution of some measures of financial work 
incentives in the UK in 2009–10 and examined which groups tended to 
have the strongest and weakest incentives to work at all and to increase 
their  earnings.  This  section  examines  how  these  incentives  changed 
between 1978 and 2009 both in terms of the incentive to work at all as 
measured by the PTR and RR, and the incentive to earn more as measured 
by the EMTR.  
We also examine to what extent changes in average PTRs, RRs and EMTRs 
have been caused by changes in the tax and benefit system by looking at 
what  PTRs,  RRs  and  EMTRs  would  have  been  under  uprated  tax  and 
benefit  systems  from  previous  years.  Appendix  B  examines  how  all  of 
these changes vary by family type. 
4.1  What has happened to financial work incentives over time? 
The incentive to work at all 
Figure 4.1 shows various points in the distribution of PTRs between 1978 
and 2009.   
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Figure 4.1: Participation tax rates, 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Includes only those who are below state 
pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey from 1978 to 2000–01 and the Expenditure and Food Survey from 2001–02 to 
2005–06. Analysis for years after 2005 uses uprated 2005 data. 
 
We can see that average PTRs were around the same in 2009 as they were 
thirty years previously at just over 50%. While the median PTR was lower 
in 2009 compared to 1978, the mean was not: this is because there were 
fewer individuals with very low PTRs in 2009. (This can be seen from the 
increases in the 10th and 25th percentiles of the distribution). Generally, 
PTRs tended to increase from 1978 to 1981, decline from then on until 
1990, increase slightly in the early 1990s and fall back again in the second 
half  of  the  decade.  A  similar  pattern  emerged  in  the  2000s,  with  PTRs 
increasing particularly strongly between 2002 and 2005 before declining 
slightly.  
Appendix B examines trends in mean PTRs for different groups and finds 
that there was relatively little variation in trends in PTRs between groups, 
although  PTRs  for  lone  parents  did  not  fall  during  the  course  of  the 
Conservatives’  period  in  government  from  1979  to  1997  but  then  fell 
dramatically between 1999 and 2002. Also, the incentive for couples with 
children to have two earners rather than one weakened between 1999 and 
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We see similar patterns over time for RRs (Figure 4.2), although using this 
measure, the incentive to work at all has strengthened on average overall. 
However,  whereas  the  distribution  of  PTRs  became  marginally  more 
concentrated  between  1978  and  2009,  the  distribution  of  RRs  became 
more dispersed, as more individuals had very low RRs in 2009 than in 
1978.  
Figure 4.2: Replacement rates, 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: As for Figure 4.1. 
Source: As for Figure 4.1. 
 
Appendix  B  examines  how  RRs  have  changed  for  different  types  of 
individual. It shows that although mean RRs have tended to move in the 
same direction for all groups at different points in time, RRs have fallen 
most  for  single  people  without  children  and  those  in  couples  without 
children whose partner works. However, RRs have risen on average for 
those in couples with children whose partner does not work.  
The incentive to earn more 
Changes in the distribution of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) over 
time are shown in Figure 4.3. We can see that the median EMTR in 2009 
was approximately the same as it was in 1978 but the mean was higher. 
The reason for this is the large increase in the number of workers with 
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tax credits were introduced in 2003, as shown by the jump in the 90th 
percentile of the distribution of EMTRs in that year.  
The  trends  in  EMTRs  over  time  are  similar  to  those  in  PTRs  and  RRs: 
namely increases from 1978 to 1981, followed by reductions during the 
rest of the 1980s, a gradual increase in the early 1990s before falling back 
again  between  1995  and  1997.  Since  1997,  EMTRs  have  increased, 
although they fell slightly in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the reduction in 
the basic rate of income tax from 22% to 20% in 2008, and the temporary 
reduction in the main VAT rate in 2009.  
Figure 4.3: Effective marginal tax rates among workers, 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). Only includes those in 
work and below state pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey from 1978 to 2000–01 and the Expenditure and Food Survey from 2001–02 to 
2005–06. Analysis for years after 2005 uses uprated 2005 data. 
 
Figure  B.3  in  Appendix  B  shows  how  these  trends  have  differed  for 
different groups. It  shows that groups with children have  seen a much 
larger increase in their average EMTR than groups without children.  
4.2  The effect of tax and benefit reforms on work incentives 
The incentive to work at all 
While tax and benefit reforms are clearly an important factor, changes in 
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demographic composition of the population, and so on. To get a clearer 
grasp of the effect of tax and benefit reforms on work incentives, we once 
again need to look at what would have happened in the absence of tax and 
benefit reforms. We again take three counterfactual baselines – one where 
all  tax  and  benefit  parameters  are  increased  in  line  with  the  RPI,  one 
where they are both increased in line with GDP and one where benefits are 
increased in line with GDP but taxes are increased in line with RPI. 
Although the mean PTR changed relatively little between 1978 and 2009 
(see Figure 4.1 above), we can see in Figure 4.4 below that policy reforms 
tended to reduce PTRs quite significantly, no matter which counterfactual 
is used. The effect of tax and benefit reforms on work incentives is smallest 
relative  to  the  baseline  of  RPI  indexation  and  largest  relative  to  the 
baseline where benefits are increased in line with GDP and tax thresholds 
are increased in line with the RPI. Even under this baseline though, after 
initially weakening work incentives, the Conservatives’ reforms from 1979 
to  1997  strengthened  financial  work  incentives  quite  considerably, 
reducing the mean PTR by 3.5 percentage points (ppts). This change is 
even greater when compared to baselines where benefits are increased in 
line with GDP.17 By contrast, Labour’s reforms between 1997 and 2009 
were broadly equivalent to RPI-indexation, and have strengthened work 
incentives only slightly relative to the other two baselines.  
Appendix B examines the effect of tax and benefit reforms relative to the 
three baselines on the average PTRs of different groups. Reforms have had 
similar effects on all groups; however, relative to all baselines they have 
had  least  effect  on  the  PTRs  of  those  in  couples  with  children  whose 
partner works.  
                                                      
17 It is clear that increasing benefits in line with GDP rather than RPI weakens work 
incentives overall. This is because raising benefits tends to increase out-of-work 
incomes relative to in-work incomes. By contrast, GDP-uprating of tax thresholds tends 
to strengthen work incentives as higher tax thresholds reduce the amount of tax that 
has to be paid on earnings.   
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Figure 4.4: Average PTRs that would be created by tax and benefit systems from 
1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those below state pension 
age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on uprated data from the 2005–06 EFS. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the same analysis for RRs. We see some differences in 
terms of the effect of policy reforms on the incentive to work at all when 
this measure is used. In particular, we see that reforms relative to RPI-
indexation only slightly reduced RRs and that Labour’s reforms between 
1997 and 2009 tended to increase RRs. Relative to the other two baselines, 
though,  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have  reduced  RRs  by  more  than  they 
reduced PTRs. Again, it was particularly the Conservatives’ tax and benefit 
reforms that strengthened the incentive to work at all, whereas Labour’s 
only reduced RRs slightly.  
Appendix B examines the effects of tax and benefit reforms on the RRs of 
different groups. Relative to all the baselines, tax and benefit reforms have 
particularly  reduced  the  replacement  rates  of  single  people  without 
children,  but  have  reduced  them  the  least  (or,  in  the  case  of  reforms 
relative to RPI-indexation, increased them) on average for those in couples 
with children whose partner works.  Relative to RPI-indexation, tax and 
benefit reforms have also acted to  increase  the average  RR  of those in 
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Figure 4.5: Average RRs that would be created by tax and benefit systems from 
1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.4. 
Source: See Figure 4.4. 
 
It is interesting that, while the mean PTR in 2009 was about the same as in 
1978, going back to a price-uprated 1978 tax and benefit system would 
increase the mean PTR by around 4 ppts. And, while the mean RR fell by 
around 3.5ppts between 1978 and 2009, our results suggest that policy 
reforms (relative to RPI-indexation) are only responsible for reducing it by 
around  less  than  half  a  percentage  point.  This  implies  that  there  were 
other changes between 1978 and 2009 that tended to increase PTRs but 
reduce RRs. Potential factors at work include: 
  Higher real earnings, which would tend to increase in-work income 
but  leave  out-of-work  income  unchanged.  This  would 
unambiguously  reduce  RRs.  The  effect  on  PTRs  is  uncertain, 
however, and would depend on whether the effective marginal tax 
rate on the additional earnings was higher or lower than the initial 
PTR.  
  Higher  real  rents  would  tend  to  increase  housing  benefit 
entitlements for those out of work, increasing both PTRs and RRs.  
  Changes  in  housing  tenure  patterns,  in  particular  the  increase  in 
owner  occupation  since  1978  would  tend  to  strengthen  work 
incentives  because  fewer  people  would  be  entitled  to  housing 
benefit when out of work.  
  The number of people entitled to disability benefits has increased 
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income but do not receive the same level of support when in work, 
meaning that their RRs and PTRs are higher.  
  Changes  in  the  demographic  composition  of  the  population.  If 
groups who have weaker work incentives become more numerous, 
as lone parents did during this period, the overall average PTR and 
RR will increase.  
Adam et al. (2006) decompose changes in the mean RR between 1979 and 
2005. They find that increases in real wages were a significant factor in 
reducing RRs, being responsible for an 8ppt decline. However, this was 
offset  by  increasing  real  rents,  and  factors  other  than  tax  and  benefit 
reforms and changes to real earnings and rents, each of which increased 
the median RR by around 2.5ppts. The fact that real earnings growth does 
not have the same effect on PTRs as it does on RRs is probably the main 
reason why factors other than tax and benefit reforms tended to increase 
PTRs but reduce RRs.  
The incentive to earn more 
Figure  4.6  presents  the  same  analysis  as  Figures  4.4  and  4.5,  but  for 
EMTRs. As in section 2.2, we only consider the EMTRs of those individuals 
under state pension age who are in work. We find that the mean EMTR 
among workers would have been virtually identical in 2009 had the 1978 
tax and benefit system simply been increased in line with either the RPI or 
GDP,  although  if  benefits  had  been  increased  in  line  with  GDP  and  tax 
thresholds had increased in line with the RPI since 1978, EMTRs would 
have been higher.18 There is some variation in intervening years, with the 
Conservatives’ reforms between 1979 and 1997 tending to reduce EMTRs 
on  average  and  Labour’s  between  1997  and  2009  tending  to  increase 
them. But what is surprising, given the large effect tax and benefit reforms 
have had on the incentive to work at all, is that any tax and benefit system 
between 1978 and 2009, whichever way it was uprated, would have left 
the mean EMTR within 5ppts of its 2009 level of 51.2%.  
                                                      
18 This suggests that the tendency of uprating benefit rates in line with GDP rather 
than RPI to increase EMTRs (which arises because more people would be on means 
tested benefit tapers) is exactly offset by the tendency of uprating tax thresholds in 
line with GDP rather than RPI to reduce EMTRs (because fewer people would be paying 
higher rates of income tax).  
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Figure 4.6: Average EMTRs that would be created by tax and benefit systems from 
1978–79 to 2009–10, workers only 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). Only includes those in 
work and below state pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on uprated data from the 2005 EFS.  
 
Appendix B shows how tax and benefit reforms have affected the EMTRs of 
different  groups  of  workers.  They  show  that  tax  and  benefit  reforms, 
relative  to  all  three  baselines  have  tended  to  increase  the  EMTRs  of 
workers with children on average, but have tended to reduce the EMTRs of 
those without children on average.  
Comparing Figure 4.6 with Figure 4.3, we can see that the mean EMTR has 
increased from around 47% to 51% since 1978, but the mean EMTR today 
would still be 51% if we returned to an RPI- or GDP-uprated 1978 tax and 
benefit system. This implies that other changes since 1978 have tended to 
increase the mean EMTR. Examples of changes that could be responsible 
include  higher  real  rents  (which  would  mean  that  more  workers  faced 
steep withdrawal of housing benefits if they earned slightly more) and real 
earnings growth (which would bring people into paying higher rates of 
income  tax).  Adam  et  al.  (2006)  find  that  each  of  these  changes  was 
responsible for increasing the mean EMTR by around 1ppt between 1979 
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4.3  Summary 
On average, PTRs were about the same in 2009 as they were in 1978, RRs 
were slightly lower and EMTRs for workers were slightly higher. Analysing 
what would have happened in the absence of any tax and benefit reforms 
shows that tax and benefit reforms have tended to reduce PTRs, and have 
had little effect on RRs (relative to RPI-indexation) and EMTRs (relative to 
both  RPI-  and  GDP-indexation).  However,  relative  to  baselines  where 
benefits are increased in line with GDP, tax and benefit reforms reduced 
RRs. Relative to the baseline where benefits are increased in line with GDP 
and  tax  thresholds  are  increased  in  line  with  the  RPI,  tax  and  benefit 
reforms have reduced EMTRs also. Therefore, factors other than tax and 
benefit reforms have been responsible for increasing PTRs and EMTRs but 
reducing RRs. Real earnings growth and real increases in rents are two 
factors that are likely to be at work here. Higher real rents tend to weaken 
the incentive to work at all and the incentive to earn more as they increase 
the  level  of  out-of-work  income  and  lead  to  more  people  facing  steep 
withdrawal of housing benefit when they earn a little more. Real earnings 
growth unambiguously reduces RRs as it means in-work income is higher 
without  affecting  out-of-work  income,  but  has  an  ambiguous  effect  on 
PTRs and EMTRs as some people will be pushed into higher income tax 
brackets while others are pushed off means-tested benefit tapers as their 
incomes increase.   
Appendix  B  examines  how  trends  in  our  measures  of  financial  work 
incentives  have  differed  for  different  types  of  individual,  and  to  what 
extent  tax  and  benefit  reforms  are  responsible.  It  shows  that  different 
groups have seen broadly similar changes in PTRs, although since 1999 
the incentive for lone parents to work at all has strengthened while the 
incentive for couples with children to have two earners has weakened. 
These  can  both  be  put  down  to  the  extension  of  in-work  support  for 
families  with  children  over  the  last  ten  years,  with  the  introduction  of 
working families’ tax credit in 1999 and its replacement with working tax 
credit in 2003. Replacement rates have fallen by around the same amount 
for all groups, except for those in couples with children whose partner 
does not work, for whom RRs did not fall between 1978 and 2009. Tax and 
benefit reforms relative to RPI-indexation can partly explain this, as they 
tended to increase RRs of those in couples with children. 
Appendix B also shows that while EMTRs have remained fairly constant 
over time for workers without children, they have increased for working 
parents.  Tax  and  benefit  reforms  can  partially  explain  this  increase, 
although other factors such as growth in earnings and rents are also likely 
to have been important.   
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5.  Conclusions 
The tax and benefit system redistributes money from rich to poor, and is 
especially  generous  to  pensioners  and  low  income  households  with 
children. However, in doing so it weakens the incentive for individuals to 
work at all and for those in work to earn more. The majority of individuals 
only get to buy goods worth around half of what their employer pays out 
(or would pay out) when they work, with the rest being taken in taxes or 
lost means-tested benefit entitlements.  
While inequality has increased since 1978, it is ambiguous to what extent 
tax  and  benefit  reforms  are  responsible  for  this.  If  we  define  ‘reforms’ 
relative to RPI-indexation, tax and benefit reforms have slightly reduced 
inequality.  However,  if  we  think  that  in  the  absence  of  tax  and  benefit 
‘reforms’ benefits would have increased in line with GDP, tax and benefit 
reforms acted to increase inequality. Even in this case, though, tax and 
benefit reforms are only responsible for around a quarter of the increased 
inequality since 1978. In any case it is clear that Labour’s tax and benefit 
reforms between 1997 and 2009 tended to reduce inequality, while those 
of the previous Conservative government tended to increase it. Labour’s 
reforms  were  particularly  generous  to  pensioners  and  low-income 
households with children.  
The  incentive  to  work  at  all  was  little  different  on  average  in  2009 
compared to 1978. There were, however, changes within this period and 
between different groups. During the Conservatives’ period in government 
from  1979  to  1997,  and  particularly  during  the  mid  to  late  1980s,  the 
incentive to work at all strengthened on average, while between 1997 and 
2009, the incentive to work at all became slightly weaker. Tax and benefit 
reforms  have  been  one  of  the  key  drivers  of  this.  The  Conservatives’ 
reforms were responsible for strengthening the incentive to work at all 
considerably, while Labour’s had relatively little effect.  
After weakening from 1979 to 1981, the incentive for workers to earn 
more  strengthened  during  the  Conservatives’  period  in  government, 
particularly during the late 1980s. The incentive for workers to earn more 
weakened on average between 1997 and 2009. The pattern is different for 
those with and without children: the average EMTR has remained fairly 
constant over time for those without children, but has risen for those with 
children.  This  is  partly  because  more  and  more  working  families  with 
children have become eligible for means-tested benefits and tax credits 
over the last ten years, meaning that they face steep withdrawal of these as 
they increase their income. However, tax and benefit reforms cannot fully  
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explain the increase in EMTRs among working parents: other factors such 
as growth in earnings and rents were also important.  
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Appendix  A:  Measuring  the  effects  of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  – 
technical issues  
Much  of  our  analysis  is  based  on  measures  of  net  incomes  and  work 
incentives  produced  by  the  Institute  for  Fiscal  Studies’  tax  and  benefit 
micro-simulation model, TAXBEN. In this appendix we give more details of 
our  methodology  for  calculating  inequality  and  our  work  incentive 
measures under different tax and benefit systems.  
Data 
TAXBEN uses data from the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). The EFS 
is an annual cross-section survey of around 7,000 households in the UK, 
available at the time this analysis was produced from the 1960s through to 
2005–06. Synthetic data for 2009–10 was created by uprating data from 
2005–06, as described in Brewer et al (2009). 
Net income 
Net income is income after deducting direct taxes on income and adding 
income  from  state  benefits  and  tax  credits.  These  can  generally  be 
modelled fairly  simply in TAXBEN; two exceptions are reforms to local 
taxation  and  disability  benefits  which  are  discussed  below.  When 
calculating  our  inequality  measures  for  previous  years’  tax  and  benefit 
systems  we  subtract  the  difference  in  indirect  tax  payments  under  the 
system in question and the 2009 system from net income in order to take 
account of the effect of indirect tax changes on inequality. Ideally, micro-
simulation estimates of work incentives would incorporate non-take-up of 
benefits and tax credits, but our need for a consistent approach over 30 
years means we opted to assume full take-up. This means that we cannot 
replicate the level of inequality in 2009, but if we assume that non take-up 
has similar effects on inequality under each tax and benefit system, our 
results will still give an unbiased estimate of the effect of tax and benefit 
reforms on inequality.    
People who work have to incur important work-related costs, such as for 
clothing, transport and childcare. Information on these costs is not usually 
collected in household surveys, making it difficult to incorporate them into 
our micro-simulation analysis. Data are available, however, on childcare 
expenditures. Deducting this expenditure from the measure of net income 
while  working  makes  a  considerable  difference  to  the  estimated  work 
incentives of parents, but we do not follow this approach. This is partly 
because  some  parents  spend  money  on  childcare  for  non-work-related 
reasons,  meaning  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  assume  that  childcare  
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expenditure would not be incurred were parents not to work. Secondly, 
the data in the EFS is not rich enough to capture all childcare expenditure.  
Reforms to local taxation 
The system of local taxation in the UK has undergone two major reforms 
over the last thirty years. The first of these was in 1990, when the old 
system of domestic rates was replaced by the Community Charge or poll 
tax and the second was when this was replaced in turn by the Council Tax, 
a tax based on banded property values, in 1993.19 The 2005–06 EFS data 
contains details of which of the nine council tax bands a household is in 
and the amount of council tax they have to pay, but obviously does not 
enable us to directly observe what a household’s liability to local taxes 
would have been under tax and benefit systems where the Community 
Charge or domestic rates regime were in force. However, the data does 
allow us to compare their local authority’s Band D rate to the national 
average, and so to calculate each household’s Community Charge liability 
in years where it is in force, we assume that local authorities would have 
the same ratio of tax to the national average under the Community Charge 
system as they do under council tax. Calculating a domestic rates value for 
each property is more problematic as it requires a ‘rateable value’ for each 
property  that  is  then  multiplied  by  a  poundage.  We  obtain  these  by 
assuming that each property has the value of the midpoint of its council 
tax band and multiplying by a poundage that ensures that domestic rates 
raise the same amount (in real terms, or relative to GDP) as they did in the 
actual year. This is then multiplied by the ratio of the Council Tax rate to 
the  national  average  to  account  for  variation  in  rates  across  local 
authorities.  Note that this may understate the level of inequality as the 
distribution of rates across local authorities was more diverse than the 
distribution of council tax rates. 
Reforms to disability benefits 
The system of disability benefits has changed significantly over the last 30 
years with changes to the conditions for claiming the benefit. In particular, 
there were changes in 1992 when Disability Living Allowance (DLA) was 
introduced and in 1995 when Incapacity Benefit (IB) replaced Invalidity 
Benefit.  This  means  that  we  are  unable  to  indentify  precisely  which 
individuals in our 2005–06 data would have been entitled to these benefits 
when they existed under previous years’ tax and benefit systems. Rather 
than ignoring these reforms, we have assumed that individuals would be 
                                                      
19 For more details of these systems, see Adam and Browne (2009).    
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eligible for the nearest equivalent to the benefit they are currently on, so 
long as that existed in that year. Specifically: 
  We assume that those individuals who are eligible for the medium 
or high rate of Disability Living Allowance in the 2005 data would 
have been eligible for the equivalent level of Attendance Allowance 
if the pre-1992 system had remained in place. However, since this 
reform introduced a new ‘low’ level of entitlement, we assume that 
those who are entitled to this level in 2005 would not have received 
anything in the pre-1992 system.  
  We assume that those individuals who are entitled to Incapacity 
Benefit in the 2005–06 data would have been entitled to Invalidity 
Benefit had the pre-1995 system remained in place. Note that one 
of  the  aims  of  the  1995  reforms  was  to  reduce  the  number  of 
claimants  by  making  the  medical  test  stricter.  By  only  giving 
entitlement to Invalidity Benefit to those who are eligible for IB in 
2005–06, we are failing to account for this aspect of the reform as 
some individuals who would have received Invalidity Benefit under 
the  old  regime  are  not  eligible  for  IB.  We  are  therefore 
underestimating the effect of this reform on income inequality.  
The ‘margin’ used when calculating effective marginal tax rates 
The empirical analysis in this report calculates effective marginal tax rates 
(EMTRs) by increasing weekly earnings by 1p. Adam et al. (2006) examine 
the implications of using a larger margin to calculate EMTRs. 
The time period considered when measuring net income 
Our analysis in this report is based on a long-run measure of net income 
(and  therefore  financial  work  incentives),  where  we  ignore  the  income 
disregard  in  the  new  tax  credits,  assume  that  no  one  is  entitled  to 
contribution-based  jobseeker’s  allowance  and  allow  home-owners  to 
receive support for mortgage interest (SMI) if they are entitled to income 
support or income-based jobseeker’s allowance. As we discuss in section 
2.2, excluding SMI can have a significant effect on our conclusions about 
the work incentives faced by different groups, as shown in chapter 4 of 
Mirrlees et al. (2010). 
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Appendix B. How have financial work incentives changed for different 
groups  in  the  population,  and  to  what  extent  are  tax  and  benefit 
reforms responsible? 
This section shows how the incentive to work at all and the incentive for 
workers  to  earn  more  has  changed  for  different  groups  over  time,  and 
examine to what extent tax and benefit reforms are responsible for these 
changes. We split people by whether they have children, whether they are 
single or a member of a couple and, if they do have a partner, whether 
their partner is in work or not. Echoing the analysis in sections 4.1 and 4.2, 
we examine how work incentives have actually changed since 1978 for 
each group before looking at the effect of tax and benefit reforms.  
B.1 What has happened to financial work incentives over time 
for different groups? 
B.1.1 Participation tax rates 
Figure B.1 shows the trends in average PTRs for different groups since 
1978. We see that most of the groups follow the overall trends shown in 
Figure 4.1, with increases in PTRs between 1978 and 1981 followed by a 
strengthening of work incentives during the rest of the 1980s, then a slight 
increase  followed  by  a  slight  decrease  during  the  1990s  and  a  marked 
increase between 2003 and 2005. There are some interesting exceptions 
to these trends, though. For example, lone parents did not see their work 
incentives  strengthen during the course of the Conservatives’  period in 
government from 1979 to 1997, with the mean PTR remaining in a narrow 
band between 58% and 64%. Since then, however, after reaching a high of 
66% in 1999, the mean PTR for lone parents fell dramatically with the 
introduction  of  the  working  families’  tax  credit, reaching  61%  in  2002. 
Other particular points to note are the big increase in the mean PTR for 
those in couples with children whose partner works between 1999 and 
2005  and  the  big  fall  in  the  mean  PTR  among  those  in  couples  with 
children whose partner does not work between 1994 and 2002.  
Although PTRs have generally moved in the same direction for different 
groups at the same time, looking over the period as a whole we can see 
that PTRs have increased on average for lone parents and those in couples 
with  children  whose  partner  works  but  have  fallen  for  single  people 
without children and those in couples whose partner does not work.   
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Figure B.1: Mean PTRs for different groups, 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those who are below state 
pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey from 1978 to 2000–01 and the Expenditure and Food Survey from 2001–02 to 
2005–06. Analysis for years after 2005 uses uprated 2005 data. 
 
B.1.2 Replacement rates 
Figure B.2 shows how RRs for different groups have changed since 1978. 
We  see  that  the  trends  in  mean  RRs  were  similar  for  the  six  different 
groups  over  the  period  in  question,  following  the  familiar  pattern  of 
increasing between 1978 and 1981 before falling during the mid to late 
1980s, then increasing in the early 1990s before falling back until 2003, 
when RRs increased a little. Since then, RRs have remained fairly constant 
for all groups. The one exception to this pattern is during the early 1990s, 
when RRs continued to decline for (actual and potential) second earners in 
couples.  This  is  likely  to  have  been  caused  by  the  shift  from  joint  to 
individual  income  taxation  in  1990  which  tended  to  improve  work 
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But while mean RRs have tended to move in the same direction at the 
same time for all groups, comparing overall levels in 2009 and 1978 shows 
some differences. Overall, mean RRs were around 4ppts lower for those in 
couples  without  children  whose  partner  works,  3ppts  lower  for  single 
people without children and those in couples with children whose partner 
works, around 1ppt lower for lone parents and those in couples without 
children whose partner does not work and around 4ppts higher for those 
in couples with children whose partner does not work in 2009 compared 
to 1978.  
Figure B.2: Mean RRs for different groups, 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
 Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those who are below state 
pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey from 1978 to 2000–01 and the Expenditure and Food Survey from 2001–02 to 
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B.1.3 Effective marginal tax rates 
Figure  B.3  shows  how  average  EMTRs  for  workers  in  the  six  different 
groups have changed over the last 30 years. We can see that since 1988, 
groups with children have seen a much steeper increase in their average 
EMTR than groups without children.   
Figure 6.9: Mean EMTRs for different groups, 1978–79 to 2009–10, workers only 
 
 Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates  but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those who are in work 
and below state pension age.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey from 1978 to 2000–01 and the Expenditure and Food Survey from 2001–02 to 
2005–06. Analysis for years after 2005 uses uprated 2005 data. 
 
B.2 The effect of tax and benefit reforms on financial work incentives 
for different groups 
B.2.1 Participation tax rates 
The next three figures show what PTRs would be today if previous years’ 
tax  and  benefit  systems  had  been  either  uprated  in  line  with  the  RPI, 
uprated in line with GDP, or if benefits had been uprated in line with GDP 































Single, no children Lone parent
Two earner couple with children One earner couple with children
Two earner couple without children One earner couple without children 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
57 
Figure B.4: Mean PTRs for different groups that would be created by RPI-uprated 
tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those who are below state 
pension age.  
Source:  Authors’  calculations using  TAXBEN  run on  uprated  data  from  the  2005–06 
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Figure B.5: Mean PTRs for different groups that would be created by GDP-uprated 
tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.4. 
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Figure B.6: Mean PTRs for different groups that would be created by tax and 
benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 with benefits increased in line with GDP 
and tax thresholds increase in line with RPI 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.4. 
Source: As for Figure B.4. 
 
Although tax and benefit reforms in particular years have tended to have 
similar effects on the different groups we consider here, when we look 
across the thirty year period as a whole, the overall effect on different 
groups has been quite different.  
Relative  to  RPI-uprating,  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have  significantly 
reduced average PTRs for single people without children, lone parents and 
those  in  couples  without  children  whose  partner  works  but  have  had 
relatively  little  effect  on  those  in  couples  with  children  and  those  in 
couples  without  children  whose  partner  does  not  work.  In  particular, 
policy reforms have reduced PTRs more for lone parents than for other 
groups. Particular reforms that appear to be responsible for this are the 
introduction  of  Family  Credit  in  1988,  the  lowering  of  the  minimum 
number of hours for lone parents to claim Family Credit from 24 to 16 in 
1992 and the replacement of family credit with the working families’ tax 
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benefit system in operation in the April of each year, the effects of this 
reform  does  not  show  up  until  2000).  Also,  tax  and  benefit  reforms, 
particularly those between 2000 and 2005, have increased PTRs for those 
in  couples  with  children  whose  partner  works.  This  is  a  side  effect  of 
increasing  the  generosity  of  in-work  benefits  –  while  these  reforms 
strengthen the incentive to work at all for lone parents and the first earner 
in a couple with children, when the second member of a couple moves into 
work, they immediately face steep withdrawal of tax credits when they 
move into work, weakening the incentive for them to work.  
Relative  to  the  other  two  baselines,  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have 
particularly reduced average PTRs for single people without children, lone 
parents and those in couples with children whose partner does not work, 
although  for  different  reasons.  For  single  people  without  children  and 
those in couples with children whose partner does not work, increasing 
previous years’ benefit levels in line with GDP would have increased out-
of-work  benefit  levels.  Therefore,  actual  policy  relative  to  this  baseline 
represents  a  cut  in  out-of-work  benefit  levels,  which  reduces  average 
PTRs.  For  lone  parents,  the  reason  that  policy  reforms  have  reduced 
average  PTRs  is  still  the  increase  in  in-work  benefit  rates  during  this 
period, but note that the effect of tax and benefit reforms is less in these 
two baselines than in the baseline where benefits are increased in line 
with the RPI. This is because the increase in in-work benefits that occurred 
over  the  period  in  question  is  smaller  relative  to  a  baseline  of  GDP-
uprating rather than one of RPI-uprating.  
Tax  and  benefit  reforms  relative  to  the  baselines  where  benefits  are 
increased in line with GDP had less of an impact on reducing the PTRs of 
those  in  couples  without  children  and  those  in  couples  with  children 
whose partner works. We saw when we looked at reforms relative to RPI 
indexation that tax and benefit reforms had not reduced PTRs of those in 
couples  without  children  whose  partner  does  not  work  by  as  much  as 
those  of  other  groups,  and  that  pattern  is  repeated  here.  For  those  in 
couples  with  a  working  partner,  we  can  see  that  the  effect  of  tax  and 
benefit reforms on average PTRs is approximately the same as when we 
consider  reforms  relative  to  RPI  indexation.  This  is  because  whether 
benefits are increased in line with GDP or the RPI makes far less difference 
to the PTRs of these groups than those of other groups – this is because 
those with a working partner tend not to be eligible for benefits when out 
of work.  
Comparing Figure B.1 with the counterfactuals in Figures B.4, B.5 and B.6, 
we  see  that,  although  tax  and  benefit  reforms  tended  to  reduce  PTRs  
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among lone parents by at least as much as among other groups, the actual 
PTR among this group is higher now than in 1978. This is likely to be 
because  the  labour  market  behaviour  of  lone  parents  has  changed 
substantially over the last 30 years. In particular, lone parents were much 
more likely to work part-time in 2009 than in 1978. One of the reasons for 
this is that incentives for doing part-time work are much stronger than 
they were in the past, mainly due to the fact that the minimum number of 
hours for claiming in-work benefits was reduced from 24 to 16 in 1992. 
Therefore,  returning  to  previous  years’  tax  and  benefit  systems  would 
significantly weaken work incentives for lone parents who are working 
less  than  24  hours  per  week.  At  the  time,  however,  lone  parents  were 
unlikely to work so little, precisely because the incentives for them to do 
so were weak, so the strengthening of work incentives caused by policy 
changes is not so clearly shown in the data on actual PTRs and RRs. This 
shows that, since the evolution of labour market participation over the last 
30 years has been caused at least in part by tax and benefit reforms, our 
analysis may be biased towards the view that tax and benefit reforms have 
improved work incentives. This is because individuals today are likely to 
choose types of work where the incentives are strongest, and the incentive 
to  undertake  these  types  of  work  may  not  have  been  as  strong  under 
previous years’ tax and benefit systems.  
As we discussed in section 4.2, factors other than tax and benefit reforms 
have tended to increase average PTRs for other groups as well. The one 
exception to this rule are those in couples with children whose partner 
does not work. For this group, the small fall in their average PTR can be 
entirely explained by tax and benefit reforms relative to RPI indexation – 
other factors have had a net effect on their average PTR of approximately 
zero.  
Summary 
There relatively little variation in changes in PTRs between different types 
of individual, although since 1999 the incentive for lone parents to work at 
all has strengthened while the incentive for couples with children to have 
two earners has weakened. These can both be put down to the extension 
of in-work benefits for families with children over the last ten years, with 
the  introduction  of  the  working  families’  tax  credit  in  1999  and  its 
replacement with the working tax credit in 2003. Tax and benefit reforms 
relative  to  RPI-indexation  have  particularly  reduced  PTRs  and  RRs  for 
single people without children, lone parents and those in couples without 
children whose partner works. Relative to GDP-uprating, tax and benefit 
reforms have particularly reduced PTRs for single people without children,  
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lone parents and those in couples with children whose partner does not 
work. 
B.2.2 Replacement rates 
Figures B.7–B.9 show the same analysis for RRs, showing what RRs would 
be  today  if  previous  years’  tax  and  benefit  systems  had  been  either 
uprated in line with the RPI, uprated in line with GDP or if benefits had 
been uprated in line with GDP and taxes had been increased in line with 
the RPI.  
Figure B.7: Mean RRs for different groups that would be created by RPI-uprated 
tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in Box 2.1. Only includes those who are below state 
pension age.  
Source:  Authors’  calculations using  TAXBEN  run on  uprated  data  from  the  2005–06 
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Figure B.8: Mean RRs for different groups that would be created by GDP-uprated 
tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.7. 
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Figure B.9: Mean RRs for different groups that would be created by tax and benefit 
systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 with benefits increased in line with GDP and 
taxes increased in line with the RPI 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.7. 
Source: As for Figure B.7. 
 
We  see  that,  relative  to  RPI-indexation,  tax  and  benefit  reforms 
particularly lowered RRs for single people without children and those in 
couples  without  children  whose  partner  works.  This  is  because  out-of-
work  benefit  entitlements  for  these  groups  did  not  increase  during 
Labour’s period in government from 1997 to 2009. Reforms also slightly 
reduced  the  RRs  of  lone  parents  on  average.  We  also  again  see,  as 
discussed in the previous section, that the incentive for couples to have 
two rather than one earner has weakened in recent years as a result of 
increases to in-work benefits and tax credits.  
Looking at reforms relative to baselines where benefits are increased in 
line with GDP gives a much larger estimate of the effect of tax and benefit 
reforms on reducing average RRs, as discussed in section 4.2. However, it 
has  much  less  effect  on  the  RRs  of  those  in  couples  whose  partner  is 
already working, principally because they would not be entitled to out of 
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to these individuals’ RRs what happens to benefit rates. However, for those 
groups for whom out-of-work benefits make up a large proportion of out-
of-work income, increasing previous years’ benefit rates in line with GDP 
would have led to RRs being much higher today.  
Comparing what has actually happened between 1978 and 2009 (Figure 
B.2) with what would have happened if the tax and benefit system had 
simply been increased in line with RPI inflation each year (Figure B.7), we 
can see that tax and benefit reforms relative to this baseline can account 
for almost all of the changes that have actually occurred in this period for 
single  people  without  children,  lone  parents,  those  in  couples  with 
children  whose  partner  does  not  work  and  those  in  couples  without 
children whose partner works.20 For the other groups (those in couples 
with children whose partner works and those in couples without children 
whose partner does not work) average RRs have fallen despite tax and 
benefit reforms relative to RPI uprating tending to increase the average RR 
for these groups. It is likely that real earnings growth is the factor that has 
tended to reduce average RRs for these groups.  
Summary 
Tax and benefit reforms relative to RPI uprating have reduced average RRs 
for  single  people  without  children,  lone  parents  and  those  in  couples 
without children whose partner works. However, they have increased RRs 
on average for those in couples with children and those in couples without 
children  whose  partner  does  not  work.  This  is  because  families  with 
children  received  generous  increases  in  out-of-work  benefits  under  the 
Labour government from 1997 to 2009. For lone parents, large increases 
in  in-work  benefits  meant  that  tax  and  benefit  reforms  have  lowered 
rather than increased their RRs. Relative to the baselines where benefits 
are increased in line with GDP, tax and benefit reforms, particularly those 
of  the  Conservative  government  between  1979  and  1997,  significantly 
reduced RRs for all groups except those who have a working partner. This 
is because out-of-work benefits tended to be increased only in line with 
inflation during this period, meaning that reforms relative to this baseline 
have involved a cut in out-of-work benefits, which would tend to lower 
RRs. Those whose partner works are less affected by this because they 
tend not to be eligible for benefits when out of work.   
                                                      
20 Of course, this is not to say that factors other than tax and benefit reforms have had 
no impact at all. Rather, all the other factors at work, including changes to real 
earnings and rents had a net effect of approximately zero on the mean replacement 
rate.   
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B.3.2 Effective marginal tax rates 
Figures B.10–B.12 show the effect of tax and benefit reforms relative to 
our three baselines on the average EMTRs of different groups. 
Figure B.10: Mean EMTRs for different groups that would be created by RPI-
uprated tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10, workers only 
 
Notes: Calculations for personal direct and indirect taxes only: excludes most ‘business 
taxes’ (notably corporation tax and business rates but not employer NI), and capital 
taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for 
non-workers calculated as described in section 2.4. Only includes those who are in work 
and below state pension age.  
Source:  Authors’  calculations using  TAXBEN  run on  uprated  data  from  the  2005–06 
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Figure B.11: Mean EMTRs for different groups that would be created by GDP-
uprated tax and benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10, workers only 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.10. 
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Figure B.12: Mean EMTRs for different groups that would be created by tax and 
benefit systems from 1978–79 to 2009–10 with benefits uprated with GDP and 
taxes uprated with RPI, workers only 
 
Notes: As for Figure B.10. 
Source: As for Figure B.10. 
 
If we use either RPI- or GDP-indexation as our baseline, it is clear that tax 
and benefit reforms are one of the main contributors to the increase in 
mean EMTRs among families with children. For those without children, tax 
and benefit reforms relative to both of these baselines have reduced mean 
EMTRs  slightly.  It  is  only  relative  to  the  baseline  where  benefits  are 
increased in line with GDP and taxes are increased in line with the RPI that 
tax and benefit reforms could be said to have reduced average EMTRs for 
those with children. This is because this baseline tends to involve EMTRs 
increasing over time both as a result of more people facing withdrawal of 
benefits if they increase their income (relative to a baseline where benefits 
are indexed with the RPI) and because more people fall into higher tax 
brackets over time as their incomes increases in real terms.  
However, tax and benefit reforms can only explain a part of the observed 
increase in EMTRs for working parents, even relative to the baseline of 
RPI-indexation.  For  example,  working  lone  parents’  average  EMTR  has 
increased by 17ppts since 1978 but tax and benefit reforms relative to 
RPI-indexation can only explain 5ppts of this. This difference is again likely 
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between  16  and  24  hours  a  week  today.  As  already  mentioned,  lone 
parents  working  so  few  hours  prior  to  1992  would  be  on  out-of-work 
rather  than  in-work  benefits,  and  these  have  100%  withdrawal  rates. 
Therefore, going back to previous years’ tax and benefit systems would 
tend to increase EMTRs significantly for these lone parents.  
For two earner couples with children, tax and benefit reforms can only 
explain 1ppt of the 9ppt increase in mean EMTRs between 1978 and 2009. 
However, tax and benefit reforms, in particular the expansion of means-
tested tax credits to this group, do appear to have been responsible for the 
increase in their EMTRs in the last ten years. Before this though, it is likely 
that  increases  in  real  wages  were  responsible  for  the  increase  in  this 
group’s mean EMTR. Higher real wages are likely to have a greater effect 
on increasing this group’s average EMTR as, before the expansion of tax 
credits since 1999, they were particularly unlikely to be eligible for means-
tested  benefits,  meaning  that  higher  earnings  would  bring  these 
individuals into higher tax brackets without reducing the number facing 
withdrawal of means-tested benefits.  
Summary 
EMTRs remained fairly constant for those without children between 1978 
and 2009 but increased substantially for those with children. Much of this, 
especially since 1999, can be explained by tax and benefit reforms which 
have  made  many  more  families  with  children  eligible  for  means-tested 
benefits, meaning that they would face steep withdrawal of these benefits 
if they increased their incomes slightly. However, tax and benefit reforms 
are not sufficient to explain the increase in EMTRs for those with children. 
Other factors, such as the increase in part-time working for lone parents 
and real earnings growth have also been important.  
 